

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

*Pls keep DDCI - DCI  
advised as usual.*

Executive Secretary

Date

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION  
Geneva, Switzerland

February 17, 1984

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Shultz  
FROM: E. Rowny *(initials)*  
SUBJECT: Trade-Offs in START

I recommend we quickly follow up Vice President Bush's meeting with Chernenko through further high-level discussions on START.

The purpose of such discussions should be to inform the Soviets that we are prepared to discuss alternative approaches to trade-offs at resumed START negotiations in Geneva. We should indicate to them that these approaches are based on codifying asymmetrical and off-setting limits between US and Soviet forces. Further, and more specifically, we should state that we are prepared to trade off limits on ALCMs we could deploy for limits on the destructive capability of Soviet ballistic missiles. The concept of trade-offs will appeal to the Soviets because of its simplicity and because it meets many of their concerns. I believe their failure to engage in a serious discussion of trade-offs at the last START round was related to their tactic of responding to INF deployments and did not reflect a disinterest in trade-offs.

Recent interagency work in Washington has focused on changes to the "framework" of the US position. This is a US fixation, based on the erroneous theory that the Soviets are more concerned about the framework of an agreement than the forces themselves. The Soviets are realists. We should deal in trade-offs and let the framework accommodate trade-offs and not vice versa.

The three specific approaches I would like to explore with the Soviets, summarized below, are described in greater detail in the attached memo.

Approach I maintains the principal features of the current US position: reductions to 5000 warheads and separate limits on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Tradeoffs are accomplished by allowing the US more ALCM-carrying bombers and the Soviets more throw-weight.



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Approach II combines one element of the Soviet position: an implicit ceiling of 1800 delivery vehicles, and one element of the US position; a separate ceiling of ballistic missile RVs--set at 6000. In contrast to the Soviet approach, however, ballistic missiles and heavy bombers would continue to be limited separately, with the US being allowed more of the latter and the Soviets more of the former. Trade-offs would be accomplished through a combined subceiling of 200 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs, which would result in offsetting asymmetries in these systems.

Approach III is similar to Approach II, except that aggregation of the 1800 delivery vehicles would be allowed. As in Approach II, trade-offs would be accomplished through a combined subceiling of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs.

From a negotiating point of view there is considerable merit in initially presenting only Approach I, since it is consistent with our current position. Therefore, in contacts with the Soviets prior to resuming negotiations I recommend that we present Approach I as an illustrative example of how the concept of trade-offs might be applied to the US position. However, in order to draw the Soviets into a dialogue on trade-offs, we will also need to make it clear that we understand their problems with our present position and are prepared to move forward provided the Soviets are prepared to move with regard to our concerns. If the Soviets say they could not accept the deep reductions of Approach I, I would explore Approaches II and III with them, but, of course, again, only after evidence that they would move toward us.

The Soviets have said that P-II and GLCM have strategic significance for them. A major question--which cannot be answered definitely until we discuss the matter with the Soviets--is whether they will be attracted to trade-offs made purely within the START context, without some solution to the INF problem. The Soviets will most likely strive to incorporate PII and GLCM into START as a result of their reassessment. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that attempting to introduce INF issues into START would pose some tricky problems for them. It is possible that drawing them into a substantive discussion of START tradeoffs could actually preempt possible Soviet moves to fold INF issues into START.

There is increasing talk around town about appointing a special emissary to open up a dialogue with the Soviets. I think bringing in someone from outside the established framework would be short-sighted and would hurt us in the long-run. The Soviets will come back to the negotiating table when they calculate it is in their interest to do so and not simply because of a dialogue in a new channel.

I would appreciate discussing this matter with you at an early date.

As stated

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Amb Adelman

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February 17, 1984

## I. Current State of Play

At the end of START Round V, the Soviets claimed that US INF deployments had changed the strategic situation and required them to reassess their START position. Accordingly, the Soviets did not agree to our proposal to resume the next round in early February.

Since the end of the last round, the Soviets have been circumspect about discussing START in public. In contrast to INF where the Soviets have conditioned a resumption to US willingness to return to the situation before deployment, the Soviets have set no preconditions for a resumption of START. The Soviet leadership has not made a major statement on START since the last round ended. Soviet media commentary on START has generally been limited to repeating familiar themes about lack of progress due to the alleged one-sided nature of the US START proposals. The Soviet media have refrained from any speculation about the future of START.

When the START talks resume, however, it is possible that the Soviets will seek to include INF issues in them. From the beginning of START, the Soviets conditioned their proposal to no increase in US "FBS." During the last round, the Soviets stressed that P-II and GLCM have strategic significance for the USSR because they can strike Soviet territory. However, the Soviets realize that introducing INF issues will pose some tricky problems for them, particularly with respect to INF aircraft. They will, therefore, probably seek to preserve as much as possible of their current START position, and avoid moving to a radically new framework. The Soviets will probably seek to exclude their own SS-20s from resumed negotiations on grounds that they cannot hit the US.

There are a number of factors which may lead the Soviets to conclude that it is in their interest to resume the START negotiations. The Soviets may believe that a resumption of the negotiations would appear to reduce the urgency of US efforts to redress the strategic balance and accordingly would undermine support for the US strategic modernization program. Similarly, the Soviets might anticipate that a resumption of START could increase opposition to the President's strategic defense initiative.

Moreover, if the Soviets anticipate that President Reagan will be reelected -- and there is currently every reason to believe that they expect his reelection -- they may conclude that it is in their interest to deal with Reagan on START this year, when they might expect him to be more susceptible to domestic pressure. The final element in the Soviet decision to return to the talks will be their evaluation of whether their walkout is having its intended effect of stimulating European pressure on the US. Continued alliance solidarity on the INF issue, coupled with the decline in anti-INF protests, may lead the Soviets to conclude that a return to the negotiating table would facilitate their efforts to divide the Alliance.

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Naming Chernenko to the position of General Secretary was implicitly a decision in favor of a cautious and consistent course in foreign policy. Chernenko's accession to power should have little immediate effect on the fundamental features of Soviet arms control policy. Continuity was the hallmark of the Andropov regime's approach toward arms control, and initial statements under the Chernenko regime have stressed continuity with the policies of Andropov and Brezhnev. There is little reason to believe, however, that the Chernenko regime will not be able to conduct a vigorous foreign policy along already established lines, or to respond to US initiatives.

Chernenko's personal room for maneuver will, of course, be limited by his reliance on the alliance of elderly and conservative figures who presumably supported his bid for power. What little we know about Chernenko's foreign policy views would tend to support the thesis that he might favor an improved dialogue with the US. Chernenko is a long-time Brezhnev protege and thus closely identified with the Brezhnev policies of detente and arms control. He has spoken most frequently on domestic issues, where he tends to be identified with moderately reformist positions. In his acceptance speech, Chernenko avoided the harsh criticism of US policies and President Reagan that had been a regular feature of Soviet statements in the last months of the Andropov regime. The new regime's emphasis on continuity points toward a return to the strategic arms control talks that have been a feature of US-Soviet relations since 1969. In addition, the new leadership will want to take steps to reassure the Soviet and Eastern European population that increased US-Soviet tension does not mean that war is imminent.

Taking all these factors into consideration, it is likely that the new regime will decide that it is in its interest to resume the START negotiations this year.

## II. Should the US Make an Initiative Now?

A major Soviet objective is to use European and US domestic concern over a hiatus in the US-Soviet arms control dialogue to stimulate pressures on us to make substantive concessions. It is important that we resist this Soviet tactic. The Soviets must not be allowed to gain the impression that they can obtain a more favorable US negotiating posture by appealing over the head of the Executive Branch.

In our private contacts with the Soviets, we should reiterate our view that a resumption of the START negotiations is the best way to make progress toward an agreement. We should stress our willingness to meet the Soviets halfway in resolving the issues which divide us. We should remind them that we have offered to explore trade-offs of their advantages for ours. But it is the Soviets who have walked away from the talks and we must

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disabuse them of any hope that we will make concessions simply to draw them back to the table.

An excessively rigorous application of this approach, however, could make it difficult to draw Soviets into serious and genuinely reciprocal discussions of START issues. We must, therefore, clearly distinguish between trade-offs in areas of mutual advantage and concessions. Moreover, we should avoid the US fixation of emphasizing frameworks. A new framework should be built around trade-offs and not vice versa.

At this juncture there is merit in viewing the change of leadership in the USSR as an opportunity for a new dialogue on strategic arms control.

US efforts to move the Soviets into a more substantive discussion of trade-offs could have a political payoff. They would be well received by those who hope that the change in Soviet leadership will lead to a more constructive discussion on strategic arms control. They would be viewed as a natural follow-on to President Reagan's call for an improved dialogue. And finally, it will be easier for the new Soviet leadership to respond to a specific US initiative than to come up with one of its own.

### III. Trade-Offs

Trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet advantage offer the best prospect of progress toward an agreement which is in the interest of both nations. Under this approach, the US would indicate a willingness to limit that element of its strategic forces of most concern to the Soviets -- our ALCM forces -- in return for Soviet willingness to limit the destructive capability of its ballistic missile forces.

During the negotiations, the Soviets have repeatedly criticized the current US proposal for allowing the deployment of up to 8000 ALCMs. For our part, we have stressed the need to reduce the destabilizing asymmetry in ballistic missile capability represented by the Soviets' three-to-one advantage in ICBM warheads and ballistic missile throw-weight.

Trade-offs between these areas of interest and advantage can be implemented through an approach which would codify asymmetrical and offsetting limits between US and Soviet strategic forces. The concept of trade-offs will appeal to the Soviets because of its simplicity and because it explicitly meets many of the concerns they have expressed during the negotiations. Such an approach would preserve the basic framework of the current US proposal, particularly the separate limits on more destabilizing ballistic missile warheads and less destabilizing bomber weapons. Moreover, it recognizes that the US and the USSR will not wish to deploy mirror image force structures. Accordingly, it allows each nation an advantage in an area of strategic forces where it has traditionally

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chosen to concentrate. The US would be allowed more ALCMs while the Soviets would be allowed more ballistic missile capability than the US.

#### IV. Specific Approaches to Implement Trade-Offs

Trade-offs can be embodied in a variety of specific US proposals. The three approaches discussed below represent a range of alternative solutions. They begin with an approach which is roughly consistent with our current position and end with an approach which combines elements of both the US and the Soviet START positions. Approach I has separate limits on missiles and bombers and requires reductions to the levels we currently seek in START. Approach II maintains separate limits on missiles and bombers but requires more modest reductions. Approach III aggregates SNDVs (but maintains separate limits on missile RVs) and requires roughly the same level of reductions as does Approach II. All of the approaches are consistent with our build-down proposal.

The following are the three approaches I have in mind, together with a brief description of the advantages and disadvantages of each. While not shown, illustrative US and Soviet force structures have been developed which indicate that these approaches are feasible for both nations.

##### Approach I

5000 ballistic missile RVs  
1250 deployed ballistic missiles  
400 heavy bombers;

US: sublimit of 200 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (4000 ALCMs)  
USSR: sublimit of 50 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (1000 ALCMs)

This option maintains the principal features of the current US position, particularly the separate limits on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Trade-offs are accomplished by allowing the US to have more ALCMs and the Soviets to have more ballistic missile throw-weight. In presenting this approach to the Soviets we would indicate that the US objective is Soviet reductions to 2.8 MKg of ballistic missile throw-weight (about one-half of the current Soviet level). We would state our willingness to achieve this objective either through a direct ceiling or indirectly through sublimits on heavy and medium ICBMs.

##### Advantages

- Would accomplish substantial reductions in all major indicators of strategic capability.

- Separate limits maintain distinction between more destabilizing ballistic missiles and missile RVs and less destabilizing heavy bombers and their weapons.

- Trade-offs are simple.

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- Meets expressed Soviet concern about US right to deploy up to 8000 ALCMs.

- As with other approaches, implicitly discounts bomber weapons by excluding gravity bombs and SRAMs.

- Unequal levels would give Soviets a face-saving way to claim they had been compensated for US "FBS." This was the same face-saving rationale they used in SALT I.

#### Disadvantages

- Very difficult to negotiate since the Soviets have made it clear they are unwilling to accept such deep reductions.

- Trade-off not very attractive to the Soviets since it requires much greater relative sacrifice by Soviets, i.e. USSR reduces its actual throw-weight by about one-half but US reduces potential ALCMs by one-half.

- Soviets could exploit proposal to achieve equality with US in heavy bomber capability, which would allow them the capability to achieve equality in ALCMs, thus undercutting the basic trade-off.

- Giving up principle of equality could be criticized domestically.

#### Approach II US

#### USSR

6000	ballistic missile RVs	6000
1450	deployed ballistic missiles	1650
0	heavy ICBM sublimit	150
350	heavy bombers	150
200	ALCM carrier sublimit	50
	(4000 vs. 1000 ALCMs)	

Approach II maintains the principle of codification of inequalities, but raises the limits to more negotiable levels. It combines one element of the Soviet position; 1800 delivery vehicles and one element of the US position, a separate ceiling on ballistic missile warheads--which in this approach is raised to 6000. In contrast to the Soviet position, however, this approach continues to maintain separate limits on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, with the US being allowed more of the latter and the Soviets allowed more of the former. Trade-offs are also accomplished by allowing the Soviets more heavy ICBMs and the US more ALCM-carrying heavy bombers.

#### Advantages

- Substantial reductions in warheads and Soviet throw-weight.

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- Ceiling of 6000 RVs and 1650 missiles probably more acceptable than levels in current proposal.

- Unequal levels of deployed missiles, heavy-ICBMs, heavy bombers and ALCM carriers directly trade off areas of US and Soviet advantage.

- As in Approach I, unequal levels would give Soviets a face-saving way to claim they had been compensated for US "FBS."

#### Disadvantages

- Soviets may be unwilling to accept ceiling on RVs as low as 6000. (However, if Soviets insist on going to a level above 6000 RVs, we would insist on appropriate throw-weight ceiling).

- US would not be able to deploy as many single RV ICBMs as would the Soviets.

- As with Approach I, giving up principle of equality could be criticized domestically.

#### Approach III

6000 ballistic missile RVs

1800 SNDVs

200 sublimit on heavy ICBMs and ALCM bombers;

This approach is similar to Approach II in allowing 6000 ballistic missile RVs and a total of 1800 delivery vehicles. Unlike Approach II, however, delivery vehicles are aggregated. Ballistic missile RVs continue to be limited separately. Trade-offs are accomplished by a combined subceiling which would result in offsetting asymmetries in ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs. If the USSR wished to retain heavy ICBMs (up to the maximum of 200), it would have to sacrifice its ability to deploy ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. In effect, ALCMs are traded for heavy ICBM RVs on a 2 for 1 basis.

#### Advantages

- Maintains distinction between more destabilizing ballistic missiles and less destabilizing bomber weapons through separate ceiling on ballistic missile RVs and through relatively permissive treatment of bomber weapons.

- Simplicity allows greater flexibility in force structuring and facilitates quick negotiation.

- Ceiling of 6000 RVs would require about a 25% reduction from current Soviet levels.

- Reductions in Soviet throw-weight would be about 2.0 Mkg. (Could be greater if Soviets chose to reduce more heavy ICBMs.)

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- Lends itself to a quick agreement but does not compromise US longer-term objectives for deeper future reductions.
- Taking elements from US and Soviet positions implements the President's call to meet Soviets halfway.
- Preserves concept of de jure equality but still allows trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet advantage.
- Adopts indirect approach to limiting throw-weight, which some believe is more negotiable.

#### Disadvantages

- Reductions are not as substantial as we would like to achieve.
- Significant change in current US proposal could appear as US move designed to bring Soviets back to negotiating table, i.e. reward them for walking out.